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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: NO CLEAR STANDARD FOR THE WAIVER
OF AN ASSERTED RIGHT TO COUNSEL
Brewer v. Williams, 97 S.Ct. 1232 (1977)
Respondent Williams, a former mental patient and religious devotee,,
was convicted of murdering a ten-year-old girl. Certain information elicited
by the police while respondent was without counsel was instrumental in
his conviction. 2 Respondent had abducted his victim in Des Moines, Iowa,
and subsequently murdered her. He then fled 160 miles to Davenport where,
after consulting his attorney, he surrendered to the police. 3 The attorney
and the Des Moines police arranged to transport respondent to Des Moines.
Although denying the attorney whom respondent had contacted in Davenport permission to accompany his client on the return trip,4 the police agreed
not to interrogate respondent during the trip5 and properly informed him
of his Miranda6 rights. Despite the agreement, one of the officers attempted
to elicit information from respondent by appealing to his religious convictions. 7 Before reaching Des Moines, respondent led police officers to the
victim's body.8 The Iowa trial court convicted respondent of murder, finding
that he had waived his right to counsel. 9 The state supreme court affirmed. 10
On a writ of habeas corpus, the federal district court reversed, finding no
waiver. 1 The court of appeals affirmed 2 and on a writ of certiorari,'1 the
1. 97 S. Ct. 1232, 1236 (1977).
2. See text accompanying note 7 infra.
3. 97 S.Ct. at 1242.
4. Id. at 1236.
5. Id. at 1235.
6. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). Prior to interrogation, a suspect must be
informed that he has the right to remain silent and that anything he says can and will
be used against him in court. He must also be informed that he has the right to
counsel before and during interrogation, and that should he be financially unable to retain
an attorney, counsel will be appointed. Id. at 467-73.
7. 97 S. Ct. at 1236. The detective noted that unless the girl's body was found that
night, the snow would cover it up and delay or prevent its discovery. He stated: "[T]he
parents of this little girl should be entitled to a Christian burial for the little girl who
was snatched away from them on Christmas Eve and murdered." The detective falsely
stated that he knew the body was in the area of Mitchellville, a town near Des Moines. The
detective followed his speech with a request that respondent not answer him but that
he think about the remarks during the trip.
8. Id. at 1257 (White, J., dissenting). Respondent incriminated himself a time considerably after one of the detectives had made the "Christian burial speech." Justice White
observed that the trip was 160 miles long and the weather was bad. He noted that the
"Christian burial speech" was delivered shortly after leaving Davenport and that the
respondent did not incriminate himself until near the end of the trip. Id. at 1257 n.3.
9. Id. at 1237.
10. State v. Williams, 182 N.W.2d 396 (Iowa 1970). The supreme court, in examining
the circumstances of the trip, agreed with the finding of the trial court that respondent
had made a valid waiver. Id. at 402.
11. Williams v. Brewer, 375 F. Supp. 170 (S.D. Iowa 1974). The district court found
that the Iowa trial court had failed to place a sufficiently onerous burden on the government in proving constitutional waiver. Specifically, the Iowa trial court had emphasized
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United States Supreme Court affirmed and HELD, respondent had not made
4
a valid waiver of his right to counsel.'
5
of the United States Constitution guarantees
The sixth amendment
the right to the effective assistance of counsel-6 to those facing criminal prosecution. That right, which has been applied to the states through the fourteenth
amendment7 and is invoked whenever a defendant faces possible incarceration,' mandates the appointment of counsel if the defendant is financially
unable to retain his own attorney. 9 Massiah v. United States20 held that an
indicted individual has a right to the assistance of counsel whenever the
government interrogates him. 21 Subsequently, the right to the effective
assistance of counsel was said to attach once adversary judicial proceedings
have been initiated against a suspect and is assured at every critical stage
22
of a criminal proceeding.
Williams' failure to reassert his right to remain silent in the absence of counsel during the
trip. Id. at 182.
12. Williams v. Brewer, 509 F.2d 227 (8th Cir. 1975).
13. 42" U.S. 1031 (1976).
14. 97 S. Ct. at 1243. The Court initially found that federal habeas corpus relief was
properly granted. Id. at 1238. The Court also found that since the detective had deliberately
sought to elicit information from respondent, the "Christian burial speech" was tantamount to an interrogation. Id. at 1239-40.
15. U.S. CONsT. amend. VI: "In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy
to have the assistance of Counsel for his defense."
the right ...
16. In Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45 (1932), counsel was technically appointed but
did not afford the defendants effective assistance. Noting that this was a capital case,
the Court held that effective counsel must be appointed when the effective assistance was
so necessary that a lack of effective counsel would constitute a denial of due process. Id.
at 71-72. For a discussion of the courts' hesitancy in reviewing the effectiveness of counsel,
see Bazelon, The Defective Assistance of Counsel, 42 U. CIN. L. REV. 1 (1973); Comment,
Criminal Waiver: The Requirement of Personal Participation,Competence, and Legitimate
State Interest, 54 CAL. L. Rav. 1262, 1276-89 (1966).
17. Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963), overruling Betts v. Brady, 316 U.S.
455, 473 (1942) (had held that the right to counsel was not extended to the states by the
fourteenth amendment unless the absence of counsel would deny fundamental fairness).
18. Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25 (1972).
19. Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458 (1938).
20. 377 U.S. 201 (1962).
21. The defendant was indicted on a narcotics violation and was free on bail. An
accomplice, in cooperation with the government, permitted an agent to hide a radio
transmitter in his car. The accomplice subsequently conversed with the defendant in the
car, and the defendant incriminated himself. The Court held that an indicted defendant
has a right to counsel when the government interrogates him, surreptitiously or otherwise. Id. at 206.
22. Kirby v. illinois, 406 U.S. 682, 690 (1972). The Court ruled that the right to

counsel at a police line-up attaches only if criminal proceedings have been initiated against
the defendant, thus making the line-up a critical stage of the prosecution. In 1964, the
Court held that the right to counsel attaches once a police investigation has focused on
the suspect. Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478 (1964). That ruling was limited by Miranda
v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966), in which the Court defined "focus" as equivalent to
custody, the significant deprivation of a suspect's freedom of action. Id. at 444. Recently,
however, the Court emphatically rejected a broad application of the focus test by defining
"focus" as questioning initiated by the authorities after a person has been taken into
custody, an apparent restatement of the Miranda definition. Beckwith v. United States, 425
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In dealing with the waiver of the right to counsel, the Supreme Court in
Johnson v. Zerbst 23 established that the waiver of a constitutional right must
be an "intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known right or
privilege."24 The Court required that such a determination be based on the
totality of the circumstances. 25 Noting that the right to counsel may directly
affect the life and liberty of the accused, the Court held that waiver of that
vital right must be made intelligently and competently and that any pre27
sumption should be against waiver. 26 Carnley v. Cochran emphasized that

waiver may not be presumed from a silent record and held that unless the
defendant had made an express statement of waiver, the burden of proving
28
waiver rested upon the state.
9
The waiver doctrine was strengthened in Escobedo v. Illinois.2 In that

case the Court noted that whenever a defendant is interrogated without his
attorney present, the state must overcome a heavy burden in order to prove
waiver.30 The Court in Miranda v. Arizona 31 even more emphatically expressed
that whenever a fifth or sixth amendment right is involved, the state bears a
heavy burden of proving a voluntary, knowing, and intelligent waiver2 - The
Miranda Court observed that modern custodial interrogations are psychologically oriented 33 and implied that even an express waiver statement may
not indicate voluntary, knowing, and intelligent conduct on the part of the
defendant.2 4 The Court impliedly reasoned that placing the heavy burden
U.S. 341, 347 (1976). For an interpretation of the earlier focus standard as well as a detailed
development of the right to counsel before Massiah and Escobedo, see Enker & Elsen,
Counsel for the Suspect: Massiah v. United States and Escobedo v. Illinois, 49 MINN. L.
REV.47 (1964).

23. 304 U.S. 458 (1938).
24. Id. at 464.
25. Id. The Court mentioned as possibly relevant circumstances the background, experience, and conduct of the accused. In that case, it noted that the defendants on trial
were isolated in a city a good distance from their homes, that their educational background
was limited, and that they were low on funds. Id. at 460 (quoting Bridwell v. Aderhold, 13
F. Supp. 253, 254 (N.D. Ga. 1935)).
26. Id. at 465.
27. 369 U.S. 506 (1962).
28. Id. at 516. The Court, in declining to overrule Moore v. Michigan, 55 U.S. 155
(1957), implicitly allowed the burden of proving that a waiver was invalid to fall upon
the defendant if he had made an express statement of waiver. See also Fay v. Noia, 372
U.S. 391, 439 (1963) (requiring waiver to be the product of a considered choice).
29. 378 U.S. 478 (1964).
30. Id. at 490 n.14.
31. 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
32. Id. at 475 (citing Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478 (1964)). See Comment, Waiver
of Rights in Police Interrogation:Miranda in the Lower Courts, 36 U. CHI. L. REv. 413,
425 (1969) (argues that the finding of a waiver by a suspect who has been warned of his
right to remain silent but who subsequently makes an incriminating statement closely
resembles the standard explicitly rejected in Miranda that a waiver may not be presumed
from the fact that a statement was ultimately obtained).
33. 384 U.S. at 448.
34. Id. at 475. The Court indicated that an express waiver statement followed closely
by an admission could constitute a waiver. For an argument that any suspect who
waives his right before having an attorney aid him is always acting unintelligently, see
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of proving waiver on the state helps to diminish the advantage the state has
in conducting inherently coercive custodial interrogations.3 5
Despite the Miranda Court's attempt to achieve uniformity in the application of its standards,36 the waiver standard necessarily requires ad hoc determinations based on the facts of each case. In attempting to eliminate the
lack of uniformity, Justice White in a prior opinion 37 suggested that once
the accused has asserted his right to counsel, interrogation must cease until
assistance of counsel is available.- In fact, such a view was also strongly
suggested by the Miranda decision,3 9 but the Court has not yet expressly
40
adopted this approach.
In the instant case, the Burger Court reaffirmed the Warren Court's holding
in Massiah by ruling that once adversary proceedings have been initiated
against the accused, 41 he has a right to counsel whenever the government
Recent Cases - Criminal Law - Confessions - Government Can Satisfy Its Burden of Proving
Waiver of Miranda Rights by Showing Warnings Given, Signed Waiver and Proof of Defendant's Capacity to Understand the Warnings, 26 VANm. L. REv. 1069, 1075 (1973).
35. See Note, Intoxicated Confessions: A New Haven in Miranda, 20 STAN. L. REv.
1269, 1280 (1968); see generally Note, Miranda and its progeny -Application and Limitation
of the Warren Court's Legacy, 21 SYRACuSE L. Rv. 232 (1969), for a persuasive argument
that the Miranda decision was an effort to diminish the use of interrogation as a primary

tool in our criminal justice system. The commentator contends that interrogation is a basic
characteristic of an inquisitorial system, a system at odds with the accusatorial system
established by the United States Constitution.
36. The Court, observing that different courts have reached varying conclusions as
to the application of procedural safeguards, granted certiorari to examine the problems in
"applying the privilege against self-incrimination to in-custody interrogation, and to give
concrete constitutional guidelines for law enforcement agencies and courts to follow." 384

U.S. at 441-42,
37.

Michigan v. Mosley, 428 U.S. 96 (1975). The Court held that even though a suspect

has asserted his fifth amendment right to remain silent, questioning may resume after a
significant passage of time as long as the suspect's right to cut off questioning is
"scrupulously honored." Id. at 104. For a criticism of the procedural standards adopted
in Mosley, see Comment, Criminal Procedure- Admissibility of Confessions-Dancing on
the Grave of Miranda, 10 SuFFOLK U. L. Rnv. 1141, 1161 n.91 (1976); Recent Developments,
Criminal Procedure-Defendant's
Incriminating Statements Elicited During Custodial
Interrogation Following His Assertion of his Right to Remain Silent is Admissible into
Evidence as Long as Defendant's Right to Cut Off Questioning Was Scrupulously Honored,
21 ViLL. L. Ray. 761 (1975).
38. Michigan v. Mosley, 423 U.S. 96, 110 n.2 (1975) (White, J., concurring). Justice
White suggested that once a defendant asserted his right to counsel, he had expressed his
own view that he was not competently able to deal with the authorities directly and,
therefore, any of defendant's statements that were made in the absence of counsel should
be viewed with skepticism. In the instant case, Justice White attempted to extricate
himself from his opinion in Mosley by contending that respondent had not himself asserted
his right to counsel and that respondent was not interrogated. 97 S. Ct. at 1259 n.6 (White,
J., dissenting).
39. See text accompanying note 75 infra.
40. Justice Powell noted: "Mhe opinion of the Court is explicitly clear that the
right to assistance of counsel may be waived, after it has attached, without notice to or
consultation with counsel." 97 S. Ct. at 1246 (Powell, J., concurring). See text accompanying
note 51 infra.
41. See text accompanying note 22 supra.
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interrogates him. 42 The Court also found that the deliberate attempt to
secure information from respondent in the absence of counsel during the
trip was tantamount to interrogation, 43 thus triggering respondent's right to
44
the assistance of counsel.
The Court resolved the waiver issue by upholding the judgment of the
federal district court 45 that: the Iowa courts had erred by placing the burden
of proving the absence of waiver upon the defendant.46 Recognizing that
waiver requires comprehension of the right before its relinquishment,- the
Court observed that respondent's consistent reliance on the advice of counsel
refuted any suggestion that he had waived that right.4 The Court also noted
that despite respondent's assertion by both words and conduct 41 of his right
to counsel, the police proceeded to elicit information from him. Although
the majority concluded that respondent had not waived his right to counsel,
it explicitly refused to decide whether he could have waived that right
under the circumstances. 50 The majority opinion, however, hinted that had
the "Christian burial speech" been prefaced by a repetition of respondent's
rights or an effort to ascertain whether respondent wished to waive those
rights, a valid waiver might have been made.5 '
Justice Powell, concurring, emphasized that a valid waiver must be made
voluntarily, a condition that the majority did not stress. 2 He agreed that
absent affirmative evidence, an inference of waiver is disfavored. 53 He then
42. Massiah v. United States, 377 U.S. at 206.
43. See note 14 supra.
44. 97 S. Ct. at 1240. The Court recognized "that no such constitutional protection
would have come into play if there had been no interrogation." Id.
45. Id. at 1241-42.
46. See notes 10 & 11 supra.
47. 97 S. Ct. at 1242 (citing Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464 (1938)). The Court reiterated that the strict waiver standard applies to pretrial proceedings, that the right
to counsel does not depend on a suspect's request, and that the presumption should be
against waiver. 97 S. Ct. at 1242.
48. Id.
49. Id. Respondent had asserted his right to counsel by securing attorneys in both
Des Moines and Davenport and by stating that he would tell the whole story once he
had personally spoken with his attorney in Des Moines.
50. Id. at 1243. Although it refused to hold that respondent could not have waived
his right to counsel, the Court did not base its decision on Chief Justice Burger's allusion
to the unarticulated premise that once a suspect asserts his right to assistance of counsel,
it is legally impossible for him to waive that right. Id. at 1249 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
See text accompanying notes 58 & 59 infra.
51. 97 S.Ct. at 1243.
52. Id. at 1245. Although emphasizing that a valid waiver must be voluntarily made,
Justice Powell, like the majority, did not directly deal with the voluntariness of the
suspect's admissions. Id. at 1239. For a history and analysis of the voluntariness test, see
Kamisar, A Dissent From the Miranda Dissents: Some Comments on the "New" Fifth Amendment and the Old "Voluntariness" Test, 65 MIcH. L. REv. 59 (1966). For an analysis of
the different standards used to determine the voluntariness of an admission, see Note,
Interrogation of Criminal Suspects, 59 Nw. U.L. Rav. 660 (1964).
53. 97 S. Ct. at 1246 (Powell, J., concurring). Justice Powell agreed with the federal
district court that the state had produced no evidence of waiver other than the fact that
admissions were eventually obtained.
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pointed to the inherently coercive environment surrounding the interrogation as another factor for finding that respondent had not made a valid waiver
of his right to counsel. 54
Chief Justice Burger, dissenting, criticized the majority for failing to find
a valid waiver despite the presence of all the elements necessary for waiver. 5
Ignoring voluntariness as an essential element of waiver, 56 he stated that the
validity of the waiver depends solely on the extent of the suspect's knowledge
of his rights.5 7 The Chief Justice concluded that a possible rationale for
the majority holding was that once a suspect asserts his right to counsel, he
becomes legally incompetent to change his mind until counsel is present. 58 He
denounced such a notion as operating to "imprison a man in his privileges."-5 9
54. In describing the custodial environment, Justice Powell noted that the weather
was ominous, the respondent was isolated with two police officers for several hours, and
the date was the day after Christmas, a factor that may have been significant in view
of respondent's deep religious convictions. Id.
55. Chief Justice Burger, dissenting, stated that the "Court assumes, without deciding,
that Williams' conduct and statements were voluntary . . . [and] concedes . . . that

Williams had been informed of and fully understood his constitutional rights and the
consequences of their waiver." Id. at 1249. The Chief Justice added that the Court found
every element necessary for a valid waiver under its own test, but nonetheless reached a
contrary conclusion. Id. In his interpretation, Chief Justice Burger failed to point out
that although the Court may have conceded that the respondent comprehended his rights,
it refused to concede that he had relinquished those rights. Id. at 1242. It is also doubtful
that assuming, without deciding, that the respondent behaved voluntarily is equivalent
to finding that the respondent had so behaved.
56. Id. at 1249 (citing Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 238 n.25 (1973), in
which the Court held that consent to a search and seizure need only be voluntary and
that it was not necessary that such consent be a knowing and intelligent waiver). Chief
Justice Burger inferred from Bustamonte that a waiver must be only knowledgeable and
not necessarily voluntary. But see Note, The Supreme Court-1965 Term, 80 HARv. L.

R v. 91, 205 (1966), which suggested that whether a suspect knowingly and intelligently
waived his rights poses the same question as whether his confession was made voluntarily.
The commentator suggested that Miranda demands that waiver be tested by a new,
stringent standard of voluntariness.
57. 97 S.Ct. at 1249. Chief Justice Burger rejected the test that requires that a waiver
be voluntary, an issue that involves the examination of all relevant circumstances pertaining
to possible coercion. Instead, he stated that the validity of a waiver of the right to
counsel turns solely on the extent of the suspect's knowledge. Such a test would make the
custodial environment's coercive nature totally irrelevant in the determination of waiver
and might further encourage the use of subtle techniques to coerce a suspect into waiving
his constitutional rights. See note 66 infra.
58. 97 S. Ct. at 1249 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
59. Id. Chief Justice Burger also recommended that the exclusionary rule not be
applied to police conduct that is not egregious. He suggested a balancing approach that
would apply the exclusionary rule only when the remedial objective of detering undesirable
police conduct outweighed the costs imposed on society by the release of a potentially
dangerous criminal. Id. at 1251.
Justice Powell conceded that the balancing test suggested by the Chief Justice had been
applied to fourth amendment federal habeas corpus claims in Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S.
465 (1967). Noting that the Stone question as applied to fifth and sixth amendment claims
was neither briefed nor argued in the instant case, however, Justice Powell recommended
delaying consideration of that question until it had been fully explored. 97 S. Ct. at
124647 (Powell, J., concurring).
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Justice White also found that respondent had made a valid waiver.60 In
determining that respondent had spontaneously changed his mind about disclosing the whereabouts of the victim's body, Justice White stated that "[m]en
usually intend to do what they do."61 He implied that unless a waiver is the
product of an overborn will,6 2 its validity is not necessarily defeated by a
certain amount of outside influence.63 Describing as "wafer thin" the distinction between the right not to be asked any questions and the right not to
answer any questions in the absence of counsel,6 4 Justice White would require only that a waiver be made prior to or simultaneously with the suspect's
statements.6 5
The Court's holding in this case at first glance reflects a liberal attitude
toward the issue of waiver of the right to counsel. One might conclude
from the majority opinion that the Court complied with the Miranda edicts
by requiring the strictest scrutiny of fifth or sixth amendment procedural
safeguards. Closer analysis, however, reveals that the Court in fact evaded
the issue of the voluntariness of a waiver.66 By indicating that the respondent
might have been able to waive his right to counsel6 7 despite the denial of permission to counsel to accompany respondent68 and despite the police officer's
avowed intention to elicit as much information as possible from respondent
while he was without counsel, 69 the majority has implicitly de-emphasized the
importance of the inherently coercive nature of a custodial environment.70
The opinion thus focused on the requirement that the waiver be knowing
and intelligent but skirted the aspect of voluntariness.
60. Id. at 1255 (White, J., joined by Blackmun and Rehnquist, J.J., dissenting).
61. Id. at 1257.
62. Id. Cf. Spano v. New York, 360 U.S. 315 (1959). In Spano, the Court reversed a
conviction obtained after an eight-hour interrogation of the defendant during which the
defendant was repeatedly denied the opportunity to consult with counsel. The Court
noted that methods of extracting confessions were becoming more sophisticated, thereby
making the Court's duty to enforce constitutional protections more difficult. Id. at 321.
63. 97 S. Ct. at 1257. Justice White stated: "[E]ven if his statements were influenced by
Detective Leaming's above-quoted statement, respondent's decision to talk in the absence
of counsel can hardly be viewed as the product of an overborn will." Id.
64. Id. at 1258.
65. Id. at 1259.
66. Justice Powell, apparently recognizing the lack of emphasis on the requirement
that a waiver be voluntary, stated that the "critical factual issue is whether there had
been a voluntary waiver." Id. at 1245 (Powell, J., concurring).
67. See text accompanying note 51 supra.
68. 97 S. Ct. at 1236.
69. Id. at 1239-40.
70. See Michigan v. Mosley, 423 U.S. 96 (1975) (Brennan, J., dissenting). Justice
Brennan pointed out that the Miranda decision was based on the premise that a custodial
interrogation was inherently coercive and to allow periodic renewals of interrogation
attempts would merely permit the coercive environment to do its work. Id. at 118.
Another recent Supreme Court decision also de-emphasized the coercive nature of a
custodial atmosphere. Oregon v. Mathiason, 97 S. Ct. 711 (1977). The Court found that
a parolee suspected of a crime who voluntarily submitted to station house questioning
was not in custody and therefore not protected by Miranda's safeguards. Id. at 714. In the
instant case, the custodial environment was arguably more oppressive since respondent
was under arrest and was not f*ree to leave the car in which he was being questioned.
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Though the Court failed to appreciate fully the coercive nature of custodial
interrogation, it is fortunate that it did not follow the guidelines suggested
by Chief Justice Burger and Justice White, both of whom appear to tolerate
the subtle psychological manipulation of a suspect as long as that manipulation does not reach the level of overbearance.71 Justice White would allow
police interrogators to question a suspect even though the suspect has
asserted his sixth amendment rights.72 Similarly, the Chief Justice approved
of those delicate techniques directed at a suspect to help him release his
normal "human urge to confess wrongdoing."' 5 In allowing a certain amount
of prompting by interrogators, both Justices would encourage the development of police stratagems designed to elicit admissions from the accused74
Although the majority was not willing to undercut a criminal defendant's
rights to this extent, neither was it prepared to affirm expressly Miranda's
continued vitality.
By refusing to adopt the rule strongly suggested in Miranda that an
asserted right to counsel may not be waived in counsel's absence,7 5 the Court
failed to recognize fully the inherently coercive environment of a custodial
setting.7 6 The weak defendant is still vulnerable to the type of subtle manipulation that may lead him to make what outwardly appears to be a knowing
77
and intelligent waiver.
The lack of a concrete formulation abuses the accused because it fails to
discourage police attempts to convince a suspect that he should waive his
71. See text accompanying note 62 supra.
72. See text accompanying notes 64 & 65 supra. Justice White maintained that Miranda
only established the right that a suspect need not answer questions in counsel's absence.
97 S. Ct. at 1258. He seemed to have ignored the following language: "If the individual
states that ie wants an attorney, the interrogation must cease until an attorney is present."
Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. at 474. Justice White also seemed to disagree with the premise
that a waiver may not be inferred. See text accompanying note 61 supra.

73. 97 S. Ct. at 1250.
74. For a description of various police methods used in conducting custodial interrogations, see F. INBAU & J. REuI, CRIMINAL INTERROGATIONS AND CONFESSIONS (2d ed. 1967).
75. "Mhe right to have counsel present at the interrogation is indispensable to the
protection of the Fifth Amendment privilege under the system we delineate today." Miranda
v. Arizona, 384 U.S. at 469. "If the individual states that he wants an attorney, the interrogation must cease until an attorney is present." Id. at 474. "Opportunity to exercise these
rights must be afforded to him [the suspect] throughout the interrogation." Id. at 479.
76. Id. at 469. "The circumstances surrounding in-custody interrogation can operate
very quickly to overbear the will .. " Id.
77. See Comment, supra note 32. The author argued that some suspects may be
personally weak and especially susceptible to manipulation and that "Es]uch individuals,
who most need the safeguard of counsel's presence, are the very persons most likely to waive
their rights." Id. at 442.
A state supreme court has rejected the validity of an express waiver due to possible
coercion. People v. Fioritto, 68 Cal. 2d 714, 441 P.2d 625, 68 Cal. Rptr. 817 (1968). Relying
on Miranda, the California supreme court ruled that an initial refusal to waive rights
was equivalent to an assertion of those rights and that all further attempts at police
interrogation should thereafter cease. Id. at 719, 441 P.2d at 627, 68 Cal. Rptr. at
. In
Fioritto, a waiver obtained after an initial refusal to waive rights was held invalid due
to intervening conduct of the police in confronting the defendant with his two accomplices.
Id.
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right to counsel. Further, by requiring ad hoc determinations of waiver of
the right to counsel based on the totality of the circumstances, 78 the Court
provided no clear guidelines for future judicial determinations of waiver.79
In a review of the words spoken between an interrogator and a suspect, crucial
circumstantial factors such as the tone of the interrogator's voice may be lost by
relying on merely the testimony of witnesses at trial.80 The Court, by failing
to adopt the position that an asserted right to counsel may not be waived
in counsel's absence, missed an opportunity to achieve uniform application
of procedural safeguards in the area of waiver of the right to counsel. 8'
The Court's narrow holding in the instant case falls short of Miranda
by failing to decide that an asserted right to counsel may be waived only
in the presence of counsel.8 2 That rule seems to be dictated not only by the
intent behind the Miranda decision 3 but also by its actual wording.8 4 The
Court expressly refused to base its decision on Miranda,5 possibly to avoid the
necessity of confronting the irreconcilable alternatives of overruling Miranda
in part or accepting its implicit premise that an asserted right to counsel
may not be waived in the absence of counsel. To avoid that confrontation,
the Court expressly based its decision on Massiah86 and on the waiver standard
8
established in Johnson v. Zerbst.

7

By implying that under some circumstances an individual who has asserted
his right to counsel may waive that right in counsel's absence, the Court
substantially narrowed the holding of Miranda."" Although the Court still
78. Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. at 464.
79. See note 36 supra. Suggested guidelines include a requirement that the interrogator
inquire into the suspect's comprehension of his rights before questioning; a requirement
that once the right to counsel is asserted, admissible statements be taken only in counsel's
presence; and a requirement that any renewed interrogation be immediately preceded by
a reminder of the suspect's rights. For a discussion of these alternatives, see Recent Cases,
supra note 34.
80. See Comment, supra note 32, at 431.
81. See note 36 supra. But see Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 545 (1966) (White,
J., dissenting). Justice White suggested that the procedural devices supplied by Miranda
allow no flexibility but act instead like a "constitutional straightjacket."
82. But see United States v. Priest, 409 F.2d 491 (5th Cir. 1969), in which the court,
relying on Miranda, noted that whenever "there is a request for an attorney prior to any
questioning, as in this case, a finding of knowing and intelligent waiver of the right to
an attorney is impossible." Id. at 493. Consequently, following such a request, any confession obtained in the absence of counsel as the result of an interrogation is per se
involuntary.
83. The Court was concerned with the "interrogation atmosphere" and sought to
limit the "evils it can bring." 384 U.S. at 456.
84. See note 75 supra.
85. 97 S. Ct. at 1239. The Court refused to reexamine the procedural rulings of Miranda
despite the urging of 22 states that filed briefs as amici curiae. Id. at 1259 (Blackmun, J.,
dissenting). This avoidance could be indicative of a reluctance by the Court to alter
drastically the Miranda guidelines.
86. Id. at 1240. See text accompanying notes 41 & 42 supra.
87. 304 U.S. 458, 464 (1938). See text accompanying note 47 supra.
88. The Miranda Court capsulized its holding: "[T]he prosecution may not use statements, whether exculpatory or inculpatory, stemming from custodial interrogation of the
defendant unless it demonstrates the use of procedural safeguards effective to secure the
privilege against self-incrimination." 384 U.S. at 444.
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admits that a custodial setting is inherently coercive, it seems willing to allow
that environment to do its works 9 as long as the interrogator does not further
contribute to the coercive atmosphere by affirmatively prodding the suspect.9 0
In bypassing a direct review of the Miranda decision, the Court has avoided
an express repudiation of that decision. By its recent holdings, however, the
Court has expressed a distaste for broad application of the Miranda rule.91 If
the Court continues this approach in future cases, it may, without explicitly
overruling Miranda, vitiate its procedural safeguards.
RICHARD ZABAK
89. See note 70 supra.
90. The majority emphasized the interrogator's attempt to elicit information rather

than respondent's isolation in a car with two police officers for several hours. 97 S.Ct. at
1243. In fact, the majority stated that the constitutional right to counsel would not have
come into play had there been no interrogation. Id. at 1240.
In his concurrence, Justice Powell expanded the notion by adding that a valid confession may be made after the right to counsel has attached. Id. at 1246. Since the right
to counsel does not come into play absent interrogation, Justice Powell's terminology is
somewhat misleading. Even under Miranda and its terminology, a confession not the result
of a preceding interrogation does not require a waiver of the right to counsel. The Court

in Miranda clearly stated that "[t]he fundamental import of the privilege [against selfincrimination] while an individual is in custody is not whether he is allowed to talk to
the police without the benefit of warnings and counsel, but whether he can be interrogated," and added that the admissibility of volunteered statements of any kind is
not affected by the Miranda decision. 384 U.S. at 478. The instant decision, however, seems
to depart from Miranda by refusing to disallow the interrogation of a suspect who
initially asserts his right to counsel but who subsequently waives that right in counsel's
absence.
91. See, e.g., Oregon v. Mathiason, 97 S. Ct. 711 (1977) (found a parolee who, upon
request of a police officer, voluntarily submitted to questioning at the station house not
to be in custody so as to trigger Miranda's procedural requirements); Michigan v. Mosley,
423 U.S. 96 (1975) (allowed a resumption of questioning after a significant passage of
time since the suspect's assertion of his fifth amendment rights, provided that the suspect's
right to discontinue interrogation was scrupulously honored); Kirby v. Illinois, 406 U.S. 682
(1972) (held right to counsel at a line-up exists only when adversary judicial proceedings
have been initiated).
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